Strike One, You\u27re Out: Should Ballparks be Strictly Liable to Baseball Fans Injured by Foul Balls by St. John, Mary C.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
12-1-1985
Strike One, You're Out: Should Ballparks be Strictly
Liable to Baseball Fans Injured by Foul Balls
Mary C. St. John
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary C. St. John, Strike One, You're Out: Should Ballparks be Strictly Liable to Baseball Fans Injured by Foul Balls, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
589 (1985).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol19/iss2/8
STRIKE ONE, AND YOU'RE OUT: SHOULD BALLPARKS
BE STRICTLY LIABLE TO BASEBALL FANS
INJURED BY FOUL BALLS?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1935, Joan Quinn was watching a baseball game between the San
Francisco Seals and the Pittsburgh Pirates at Recreation Park in San
Francisco. Seated in an unscreened area near first base, she was hit by a
foul ball and injured. Ms. Quinn sued and her case eventually reached
the California Supreme Court. The court addressed the issue of the
ballpark's liability for her injury and issued its opinion in Quinn v. Recre-
ation Park Association.' In this well-known case, the court defined the
ballpark's duty to Ms. Quinn by stating that "[tihe duty imposed by law
is performed when screened seats are provided for as many [fans] as may
be reasonably expected to call for them on any ordinary occasion."2 The
court held that the ballpark, having met this duty toward Ms. Quinn and
other baseball fans by providing the requisite screened seats, could not be
held liable for her injuries.'
The San Francisco Seals no longer play in Recreation Park.4 How-
ever, the supreme court's opinion continues to play throughout the state,
most recently in the California Court of Appeal's decision in Rudnick v.
Golden West Broadcasters.5
In Rudnick, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the fifty-
year-old standard of Quinn controlled, despite the changes that have oc-
curred over the years in stadium design, consumer expectations and the
"grand old game" itself. The court stuck to the Quinn standard even
though similar formalistic rules of duty and liability have been modified
in light of current economic and public policy considerations, as demon-
strated by the California Supreme Court's decisions in Rowland v. Chris-
tian,6 Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,' and Peterson v. San Francisco Community
1. 3 Cal. 2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935).
2. Id. at 729, 46 P.2d at 146.
3. Id.
4. The San Francisco Seals went on to play in Seal Stadium before fading into history. At
the time Quinn was decided in June of 1935, the Seals-with Joe DiMaggio on the team-were
in fourth place in the Pacific Division of their league. L.A. Times, June 11, 1935, pt. III, at 15,
col. 6.
5. 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 202 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1984).
6. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (redefining landowner liability).
7. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (establishing comparative
fault).
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College District.8
As a result of judicial adherence to this standard of limited duty, a
baseball spectator hit by a ball fouled into the stands is practically with-
out a remedy, despite the spectator's inability to protect himself from
injury and despite his status at the ballgame as a paying business invitee.9
A ballpark is not held to the standard of care imposed on other property
owners ° and is without an incentive to periodically review the safety of
the ballpark.
This Note considers the issue of a ballpark's duty raised in Rudnick
and the continued viability of the Quinn standard. In addition, this Note
reviews the historical doctrine of assumption of risk as it has been ap-
plied to baseball spectator injuries and the possible application of com-
parative negligence. Rudnick is then discussed and analyzed to
demonstrate the interplay of these basic tort concepts in judicial review
of liability for baseball spectator injuries. Following the discussion of
Rudnick, this Note offers a strict liability approach to the issue of
ballpark liability.
II. BACKGROUND
To examine the issue of liability, one should consider the traditional
negligence analysis. A court, faced with an injured plaintiff claiming
negligence, typically will ask: "Is there a duty? If so, what is the extent
of the duty? Has the duty been breached? If so, does the defendant have
an atfirmative defense available?" Applied to the ballpark, this inquiry
generally results in immunity. The theory supporting this result is either
that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury or that the ballpark had satis-
fied its duty of care as a matter of law.1'
8. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984) (enlarging landowner
liability).
9. A plaintiff's status-trespasser, licensee or invitee-no longer determines a property
owner's liability for a plaintiff's injuries. However, it is a factor to be considered when defining
the reasonable standard of care owed to the plaintiff. See generally Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying
text.
10. See, eg., Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685
P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984); see infra at text accompanying notes 116-33 for discus-
sion of Peterson.
11. If the injured plaintiff is a spectator at the ballpark, the response will be: The ballpark
has a duty to protect spectators from injury. To meet this duty, the ballpark must screen some
seats. The ballpark need not screen all seats because many baseball fans prefer unscreened
seats. The extent of the ballpark's duty to protect spectators is limited by the countervailing
interest in unscreened seats. If this duty has not been breached, the ballpark has not been
negligent and the case would be dismissed. See, e.g., Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n, 3 Cal.
2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935).
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The problem with the analysis stems from the equivocal use of the
words "assumption of risk." First, the term has been used as a reason for
limiting the duty of the ballpark-before any breach of duty has been
found. Second, the term has been used as an affirmative defense to negli-
gence-after a breach of duty has been found.'2
The distinction between these two uses of the assumption of risk
concept (and any meaningful role played by assumption of risk) went
unexplored until comparative fault was adopted by the majority of juris-
dictions because either use resulted in ballpark immunity.13 Under com-
parative fault, most forms of assumption of risk have been redefined as
either comparative negligence or as an absence of duty.14 As a form of
comparative negligence, assumption of risk reduces but does not prevent
recovery; as a means of negating the duty owed to the plaintiff, assump-
tion of risk prevents recovery.
A. Duty of the Ballpark
The first part of the negligence analysis is a determination of the
existence and extent of the duty owed to the plaintiff. The California
12. Compare Baker v. Topping, 15 A.D.2d 193, 222 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1961) (baseball specta-
tor precluded from recovery under assumption of risk) with Akins v. Glens Falls City School
Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 424 N.E.2d 531, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1981) (baseball spectator precluded
from recovery because stadium satisfied legal duty). The problem is that the questions asked at
the duty stage are different from those asked after negligence has been established.
13. Comparative fault was developed in response to the all-or-nothing recovery allowed
under traditional affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. For
example, in an auto accident, if both parties were negligent (one speeding, the other running a
red light), neither could recover on the theory that each was contributorily negligent and
should not benefit from his own negligence. After comparative fault, each party's actions are
assessed and recovery is reduced in proportion to the extent each is negligent. In the context
of a spectator being hit by a foul ball at a baseball game, if the ballpark were negligent (e.g.,
failing to screen any part of the stadium), the plaintiff could be prevented from recovering on
the ballpark's affirmative defense that the plaintiff assumed the risk of being hit by a baseball
while watching the game. After comparative fault, the fault of the ballpark might be com-
pared with the plaintiff's "fault" (e.g., failing to watch the ball). See, e.g., Kennedy v. Provi-
dence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977) (comparative negligence statute
does not apply when plaintiff reasonably assumes risk; assumption of risk a complete defense);
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (assumption of risk merged into comparative negligence),
on remand, 350 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1977); see generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE § 9.1-9.5 (1974); W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 68 at 495-98 (5th ed. 1984); infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
14. See generally Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (reasonable assumption of risk
reduces duty, unreasonable assumption of risk is contributory negligence and subsumed into
comparative fault), on remand, 350 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1977); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver
County School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981) (form of assumption of risk that is
contributory negligence merged into comparative fault; other forms abolished unless express,
preserved by statute or as applied to strict liability actions).
592 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:589
Supreme Court defined this duty in Quinn v. Recreation Park Associa-
tion,15 the principal case governing ballpark liability for spectator inju-
ries. The facts in Quinn were typical of those in early spectator injury
cases.16 Ms. Quinn went to the ballpark and, when purchasing her
ticket, requested a screened seat along the first base line.17 When es-
corted to her seat, however, she learned that only unscreened seats re-
mained in the area in which she wished to sit. She protested, but the
usher asked her to be seated. Ms. Quinn took the unscreened seat and
was injured by a batted ball.18 At trial, she admitted knowing the danger
of being struck by a batted ball at the time she accepted the unscreened
seat.19
In order to determine the ballpark's duty to the spectator, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court looked to the law in other jurisdictions and then
concluded that the ballpark had met its duty when it provided "screened
seats... for as many as may be reasonably expected to call for them on
any ordinary occasion."2 The evidence at the lower court showed that
Recreation Park did provide a sufficient number of screened seats.21
Under the traditional negligence analysis, the court could have ended its
opinion at this point. (Since the ballpark had met its legal duty, it was
not negligent.22) However, the court went on to discuss the plaintiff's
assumption of risk.23
In a similar case decided fifteen years after Quinn, the California
15. 3 Cal. 2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935).
16. The cases usually indicated that the plaintiff chose an unscreened seat when buying a
ticket. See, e.g., Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S.W.
1076 (1913) (plaintiff brought unreserved grandstand seat entitling him to select screened or
unscreened seat); Edling v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 181 Mo. App. 327, 168
S.W. 908 (1914) (plaintiff bought unreserved grandstand seat entitling him to select screened
or unscreened seat); Blackhall v. Albany Baseball & Amusement Co., 157 Misc. 801, 802, 285
N.Y.S. 695, 695-96 (1936) (plaintiff familiar with field selected unscreened seat in bleachers to
"receive the benefit of the sun"); Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., 215 N.C. 64, 1 S.E.2d 131
(1939) (plaintiff bought unreserved seat for 40 cents rather than screened seat for 65 cents);
Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club Co., 62 Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E.2d 837 (1939) (plaintiff
selected unscreened seat for 10 cents rather than screened seat for 25 cents); Williams v. Hous-
ton Baseball Ass'n, 154 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (plaintiff selected unscreened seat
knowing screened seats available).
17. 3 Cal. 3d at 730, 46 P.2d at 146.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 731, 46 P.2d at 146-47.
20. Id. at 729, 46 P.2d at 146.
21. Id. at 730, 46 P.2d at 146.
22. Without a breach of a legal duty, there is no negligence. Traditionally, assumption of
risk has been a defense to negligence and does not enter the analysis until after negligence is
proven. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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Court of Appeal, in Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club,24 reaffirmed a
ballpark's limited duty:
[T]he owner of property... is not an insurer of safety but must
use reasonable care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe
condition and give warning of latent or concealed perils. He is
not liable for injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which
was obvious or should have been observed in the exercise of
reasonable care .... To the extent that the duty of self-protec-
tion rests upon the invitee, the duty of the invitor to protect is
reduced. 5
The court recognized the ballpark's duty as that established in Quinn. 6
It concluded that since the stadium had satisfied this legal duty, the
plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action. 7
As in Quinn, the court in Brown could have ended its inquiry at that
point. Without a breach of duty, there is no negligence and the inquiry
ceases. However, it chose to address two arguments presented by the
plaintiff. First, Ms. Brown claimed she could not "assume the risk" be-
cause she did not know of (and thus could not assume) the risks inherent
in watching a baseball game. Second, she alleged that the ballpark had a
duty to warn her of possible dangers and was negligent for failing to do
so. 8 The Brown court rejected these arguments, citing with approval a
Texas case, Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 9 in which the trial judge
rejected a jury finding that a ballpark was negligent for failing to warn
patrons of the dangers incident to sitting in the unscreened areas and
held that the plaintiff had assumed the risk merely by attending the
game. This ruling was affirmed by the Texas appellate court. The court
noted that the injured spectator's 14-year-old son, who accompanied his
mother to the game, was a baseball fan and she had seen him handle
baseballs around the home.
This history, coupled with a universal common knowledge, was
bound to have acquainted plaintiff with the potential dangers
inherent in a baseball in play; with the fact that a flying baseball
is capable of inflicting painful, sometimes serious and even fa-
tal, injury; and that when in play it may fly in any direction and
strike any bystander not on the alert to evade it.
30
24. 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 222 P.2d 19 (1950).
25. Id. at 486-87, 222 P.2d at 20 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 487-88, 222 P.2d at 20-21.
27. Id. at 488, 222 P.2d at 21.
28. Id.
29. 150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
30. Id. at 371.
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Thus, the legal duty of the ballpark after Brown was further refined
such that the ballpark had no duty to warn patrons of the dangers of
unscreened seats or notify them of the availability of screened seats. In
doing so, the Brown court appeared to use assumption of risk as a reason
for limiting the ballpark's duty, rather than as an affirmative defense to
negligence.
B. Assumption of Risk
Looking again to the traditional negligence analysis, assumption of
risk may be present at either the duty stage or the affirmative defense
stage. A brief background of assumption of risk doctrine may be help-
ful.31 First, assumption of risk may be broken down into two catego-
ries-express or implied.32
1. Express assumption of risk versus implied assumption of risk
Express assumption of risk is contractual in nature; the parties agree
in advance to limit their duties and their liabilities to one another. Sub-
ject to general limitations on contract enforceability, these covenants
have been held valid.33 Implied assumption of risk is where one party's
actions have implied an agreement to relieve the other party of a duty of
31. The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of the extent to which
uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expression;
its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal
formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory
ideas.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32. See generally, Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 437
A.2d 1198 (1981); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Meistrich v. Casino Arena
Attractions, Inc., 54 N.J. Super. 25, 148 A.2d 199 (1959); W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at § 68.
33. In California, contracts expressly limiting one party's liability for negligence will not
be enforced if the transaction has some or all of the following characteristics:
It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The
party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to
the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the
public. The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any mem-
ber of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain
established standards. As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the eco-
nomic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive
advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his
services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public
with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision
whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection
against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of
the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of careless-
ness by the seller or his agents.
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98-101, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33, 37-38 (1963).
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reasonable care.34
a. primary implied assumption of risk
Implied assumption of risk has been further divided into two catego-
ries-primary and secondary. Primary assumption of risk has been de-
fined as where the defendant cannot be held negligent because he is under
no duty to the plaintiff, or there has been no breach of duty because
plaintiff's conduct has limited the duty owed him by defendant.35 Base-
ball spectators have been analyzed within this category. According to
Dean Prosser, the spectator
may enter a baseball park, sit in an unscreened seat, and so
consent that the players may proceed with the game without
taking any precautions to protect him from being hit by the
ball.... [T]he legal result is that the defendant is simply re-
lieved of the duty which would otherwise exist.36
Because there is no longer a duty, there is no negligence and the plain-
tiff's suit may be summarily dismissed.
b. secondary implied assumption of risk
Secondary implied assumption of risk has been defined by the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts as follows:
[A] plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself...
caused by the defendant's conduct or by the condition of the
defendant's land or chattels, and who nevertheless voluntarily
chooses to enter or remain . . . within the area of that risk,
under circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it, is
not entitled to recover for harm within that risk.37
Under secondary implied assumption of risk the defendant is negligent to
some degree, while under primary assumption of risk the defendant can-
not be negligent because he has no duty.38
Secondary assumption of risk is further divided into two catego-
ries-reasonable and unreasonable.39 These two classifications were dis-
34. See supra note 32; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at § 9.1-9.5.
35. See supra notes 32 & 34; Kionka, Implied Assumption of the Risk" Does It Survive
Comparative Fault?, 1982 S. ILL. U. L.J. 371.
36. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 481.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496(C)(1) (1965) (emphasis added).
38. See supra note 35.
39. See supra note 35; James, Assumption of Risk Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J.
185 (1968).
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tinguished in Gonzalez v. Garcia.' According to the court, unreasonable
implied assumption of risk occurs "where the plaintiff acts unreasonably
in voluntarily exposing himself to a risk created by defendant's negli-
gence," while reasonable implied assumption of risk occurs "where plain-
tiff acts reasonably in voluntarily encountering a risk with the knowledge
that defendant will not protect him."
4 1
As mentioned, under primary assumption of risk, the baseball sta-
dium's duty has been limited by the spectator's assumption of risk and
the negligence inquiry, "Is there a duty?" is resolved at that point. On
the other hand, secondary reasonable implied assumption of risk can be a
defense to negligence when the plaintiff voluntarily, with full knowledge
and appreciation of the risk, nonetheless chooses to expose himself to
that risk.42 His subjective decision to assume the risk may be inferred
from his actions.43 In the baseball injury case, the analysis could be that
the ballpark is negligent by failing to warn. However, the ballpark is
relieved of liability because the spectator, knowing or assumed to know
that baseballs travel unpredictably and may injure one seated in an un-
screened area, has chosen to assume the risk of this negligence, as evi-
denced by his sitting in the unscreened area.'
Historically, the ballpark has escaped liability under either the pri-
mary (duty) or secondary (assumption of risk) analysis. Thus the courts
did not need to carefully articulate which rationale they were relying
upon when denying the injured spectator relief for his injuries.4" For ex-
40. 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1977). In Gonzalez, the plaintiff, defendant
and two other people left work together and drank beer, tequila and other beverages for over
three hours. The plaintiff, Gonzalez, had made some attempts to obtain a ride home from
someone other than the drunken defendant, but was unsuccessful. On the way to Gonzalez'
house, defendant lost control of the car and Gonzalez suffered a concussion and fracture. Id.
at 875-77, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04.
The court held that Gonzalez acted unreasonably in accepting a ride home with the
drunken defendant. However, Gonzalez was allowed a reduced recovery under principles of
comparative fault. Id. at 881, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 507. It is ironic that under California law,
Gonzalez' unreasonable behavior resulted in some compensation for his injuries while a rea-
sonable baseball spectator receives nothing.
41. Id. at 878, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 505 (emphasis added).
42. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43. Id.
44. Curiously, the courts seem to impute to the plaintiff not only knowledge of the risks in
selecting an unscreened seat, but also knowledge that there is an alternative-that, by law, the
ballpark has a duty to provide a reasonable number of seats for those fans requesting them.
Query what would be more reasonable: imposing on the ballparks a duty to warn spectators of
the risk of fast-moving baseballs or imposing on the ballparks a duty to inform spectators of
their right to request a screened seat.
45. See, e.g., Vines v. Birmingham Baseball Club, Inc., 450 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 1984);
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ample, in Quinn v. Recreation Park Association,4 6 after holding that the
ballpark had met its legal duty to provide a reasonable number of
screened seats, the court went on to recite detailed facts demonstrating
that Ms. Quinn, in temporarily accepting the unscreened seat with full
knowledge of the potential danger involved, assumed the risk of injury,
precluding recovery of damages.47 It appears that the court did consider
Ms. Quinn's actual subjective knowledge to have some bearing on the
question of the ballpark's liability and, had the ballpark been found negli-
gent, would still have held for the ballpark based on the plaintiff's secon-
dary reasonable assumption of risk.48
The same assumption of risk issue was addressed in Brown v. San
Francisco Ball Club.49 Ms. Brown argued that she did not know of the
dangers inherent in watching a baseball game and could not be held to
have assumed the risk.50 The plaintiff alleged that she had never at-
tended a baseball game, although she had watched one game from a dis-
tance while seated in an automobile. She also argued that she had only
been at the game for about an hour before being injured and she had
spent the entire time "visiting with a friend," oblivious to the ball in
play."1 Nonetheless, the court upheld the application of Quinn, stating
that "by voluntarily entering into the sport as a spectator [s]he know-
ingly accepts the reasonable risks and hazards inherent in and incident to
the game."
'52
III. DEVELOPING TORT LAW
In the years since the Quinn v. Recreation Park Association and
Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club decisions, the law of negligence has
substantially changed, particularly in the analyses of duty and negli-
gence. Two of the California Supreme Court's decisions, Rowland v.
Christian 53 and Li v. Yellow Cab Co., and their applicability to baseball
O'Bryan v. O'Connor, 59 A.D.2d 219, 399 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1977); Stradtner v. Cincinnati Reds,
Inc., 39 Ohio App. 2d 199, 316 N.E.2d 924 (1972).
46. 3 Cal. 2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935).
47. Id. at 731, 46 P.2d at 147.
48. A commentator at the time Quinn was decided believed that: "The California court in
the Quinn case stressed the fact that the plaintiff's assumption of risk was based upon her
knowledge and appreciation of the danger." Comment, Torts: Liability of Exhibitors to Spec-
tators at Public Exhibitions: Assumption of Risk, 24 CAL. L. REv. 429, 440 (1936).
49. 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 222 P.2d 19 (1950).
50. Id. at 488, 222 P.2d at 21.
51. Id. at 488-89, 222 P.2d at 21.
52. Id. at 487, 222 P.2d at 20.
53. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
54. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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spectator injury cases, were considered by two of the judges in Rudnick
v. Golden West Broadcasters. Rowland was analyzed because of its refor-
mation of the duty inquiry; Li was considered because of its discussion of
assumption of risk after comparative fault.
A. Rowland v. Christian
In Rowland v. Christian," the plaintiff, Mr. Rowland, was visiting
Ms. Christian at her apartment. While using the bathroom, he turned
the porcelain handle of the cold water faucet. The handle broke, severely
injuring his hand. Ms. Christian had known the handle was cracked, had
told her landlord the handle was cracked, but had failed to warn Mr.
Rowland of the danger. The California Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's holding in favor of Ms. Christian's motion for summary
judgment, and reevaluated the foundations of the landowner's traditional
duty of care.
The court in Rowland emphasized that the basic California policy,
as stated in California Civil Code section 1714, is "[e]very one is respon-
sible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the man-
agement of his property or person, except so far as the latter has...
brought the injury upon himself."56 Exceptions to this general rule must
be "clearly supported by public policy."
'5 7
As a guide to determining what policy considerations dictate impos-
ing a duty, the court set out a balancing test involving the following
factors:
[1] the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, [2] the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [3] the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, [4] the moral blame attached to the defendant's con-
duct, [5] the policy of preventing future harm, [6] the extent of
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the commu-
nity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability
for breach, and [7] the availability, cost and prevalence of in-
surance for the risk involved."
55. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
56. Id. at 111-12, 443 P.2d at 563-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100. The statute was reinter-
preted seven years later to create California's law of comparative negligence. See Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 60-69 for a discussion of Li.
57. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
58. Id. at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
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In sum, Rowland held that the liability of a landowner is to be deter-
mined by the general policies underlying tort law, rather than by the
formalistic distinctions of trespasser, licensee and invitee derived from
ancient property law.59
B. Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
Assumption of risk as an affirmative defense to negligence-the pos-
sible alternate basis for denying liability in Brown v. San Francisco Ball
Club and Quinn v. Recreation Park Association-was partly eliminated
by California's adoption of a system of comparative fault in Li v. Yellow
Cab Co." The court in Li held that assumption of risk, where the plain-
tiff's conduct is unreasonable, was considered contributory negligence
and became an element of the comparative fault scheme.61 A plaintiff's
negligence, to the extent that it contributed to his injuries, was no longer
a complete bar to recovery, but only reduced his recovery in proportion
to his culpability. The court's opinion on the future of reasonable as-
sumption of risk is less clear. As a result, the lower courts have dis-
agreed on the proper application of reasonable assumption of risk after
Li.6 2 The court's entire statement on assumption of risk follows:
As for the assumption of risk, we have recognized in this state
that this defense overlaps that of contributory negligence to
some extent and in fact is made up of at least two distinct de-
fenses. "To simplify greatly, it has been observed ... that in
one kind of situation, to wit, where a plaintiff unreasonably un-
dertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by a de-
fendant's negligence, plaintiff's conduct, although he may
encounter that risk in a prudent manner, is in reality a form of
contributory negligence .... Other kinds of situations within
the doctrine of assumption of risk are those, for example, where
plaintiff is held to agree to relieve defendant of an obligation of
reasonable conduct toward him. Such a situation would not
involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of de-
fendant's duty of care." We think it clear that the adoption of a
system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the
defense of assumption of risk into the general scheme of assess-
ment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in
59. Id. at 118-19, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
60. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
61. Id. at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
62. Compare Rudnick v. Golden W. Broadcasters, 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 202 Cal. Rptr.
900 (1984) with Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983).
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which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a
variant of contributory negligence.63
Clearly, unreasonable assumption of risk, as a "variant of contribu-
tory negligence," is to become part of the comparative fault scheme.
Thus, the plaintiff who acts negligently or unreasonably may recover, but
his recovery will be reduced to the extent he contributed to his own in-
jury.64 What is left unclear after Li is whether a reasonable act, such as
attending a ball game, may be subject to the comparative fault frame-
work, or whether the reasonable actor may be subject to assumption of
risk as a complete affirmative defense, freeing the ballpark from liability
for spectator injuries.
To complicate the possibilities further, the court in Li also recog-
nized that assumption of risk can act to reduce or relieve the defendant's
initial duty of care.6' This assumption of risk, corresponding to primary
assumption of risk,6 6 may be by express waiver or by some action that
implies an agreement reducing the defendant's duty of care.67 Courts in
other jurisdictions adopting comparative fault have held that the
ballpark injury cases illustrate this reduction of a defendant's duty.68
63. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added in last quoted sentence).
64. Id. at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243-44, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76; see generally V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at § 9.1-9.5. For a criticism of this view, see Fleming, The
Supreme Court of California 1974-1975. Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judi-
cial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 239 (1976).
65. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
67. See supra notes 32, 35 & 39.
68. The New York Court of Appeals applied the baseball spectator's assumption of risk to
the state's comparative negligence statute in Aldns v. Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 N.Y.2d
325, 424 N.E.2d 531, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1981). Under the New York statute, assumption of
risk no longer bars recovery. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976) ("In any action
to recover damages for personal injury, . . . the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant
... including ... assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery .... ") Faced with a baseball
spectator's suit, the court held that the stadium met its legal duty under a standard similar to
that of Quinn, and therefore was not negligent. The court reasoned that without negligence on
the part of the defendant ballpark, the comparative negligence statute did not apply. Akins, 53
N.Y. 2d at 333, 424 N.E.2d at 535, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
The dissent disagreed and argued that the majority's decision was contrary to § 1411:
[T]he majority, although it speaks in terms of the defendant's duty of reasonable
care, has effectively resurrected those doctrines [of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk] as total bars to recovery. By holding as a matter of law that the
defendant's duty of reasonable care extends only to the construction of a backstop of
specific proportions, the majority forecloses a jury from considering any other factors
that might be present in an individual case. This rule of law denies recovery to in-
jured spectators as effectively as the old doctrines of assumption of the risk and con-
tributory negligence ever did, and uses a fundamentally similar rationale to do so.
Id. at 337, 424 N.E.2d at 537, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 650 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). It appears that
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In addition, Li failed to clearly address the future of the defense of
secondary assumption of risk-where the plaintiff, acting reasonably,
knowingly and voluntarily, agrees to assume the risk created by defend-
ant's actual negligence. Baseball cases such as Quinn and Brown, which
were decided before comparative fault was adopted, did not distinguish
between the "no duty" defense and secondary assumption of risk because
both led to the same result-no recovery for the plaintiff. Since Li is
silent on secondary assumption of risk, and the precedent baseball cases
are unclear about the theory on which their decisions were based, the
court in Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters69 was divided on the appli-
cability of comparative fault to the baseball spectator injury case.
IV. THE CASE: R UDNICK V. GOLDEN WEST BROADCASTERS
Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters7" exemplifies the difficulty in
reconciling modem tort law with the baseball stadium's historically lim-
ited liability. Ms. Rudnick was watching the California Angels play a
major league game at Anaheim Stadium in Anaheim, California. She
was seated in an unscreened area near first base when a player hit a foul
ball. The baseball smashed into Ms. Rudnick's face and broke her
cheekbone.71
Ms. Rudnick filed a personal injury action against Golden West
Broadcasters, the Angels' corporate owner. She alleged two causes of
action: one for negligent construction, maintenance, operation and re-
pair of the stadium's premises and a second for breach of an implied
warranty that spectators seated in the unscreened areas would be pro-
tected from baseballs hit in their direction.72 The trial court granted
Golden West's motion for summary judgment based on the stadium
manager's declaration that the screen was in place and covered the area
behind home plate. In granting summary judgment, the court did not
distinguish between the negligence and breach of implied warranty
theories.73
The court of appeal reversed and remanded, stating that Golden
the New York court was required to define assumption of risk in terms of duty in order to
reach the result it did and avoid the constraints of the statute. For a review of the Akins case,
see Recent Development, Akins v. Glens Falls City School District: A Crack in the Wall of
Comparative Negligence, 46 ALB. L. REv. 1533 (1982).
69. 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 202 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1984).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 795, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 901; telephone conversation with Ms. Rudnick's attorney
in August, 1984.
72. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 795, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
73. Id.
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West's declarations were insufficient to support the judgment that it had
met its legal duty. Recognizing that the Quinn v. Recreation Park Associ-
ation standard controlled, the court noted that the declarations failed to
indicate how many baseball fans requested, or could be reasonably ex-
pected to request, screened seats. The declarations also failed to corre-
late the number of seats available with the number of requests reasonably
expected. The court observed that only 2300 screened seats were avail-
able for the 23,000 to 46,000 spectators regularly attending Angel base-
ball games.74
On appeal, Ms. Rudnick alternatively argued 75 that the Quinn rule
was eliminated by Rowland v. Christian
76 and Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 77
Judge Crosby, writing only for himself, used Ms. Rudnick's argument as
a vehicle to state that, in his opinion, Quinn was still the standard of the
ballpark's duty.78 Judge Trotter, concurring in the result only, disagreed
and argued that Rowland and Li require the trier of fact to resolve the
issue of the ballpark's liability.7 9
A. Judge Crosby's Opinion
Judge Crosby first reviewed the baseball cases-Quinn v. Recreation
Park Association,8 0 Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club"1 and Brown v.
San Francisco Ball Club."2 He maintained that before Quinn all specta-
74. Id. at 796, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02.
75. Id., 202 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
76. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). See supra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
77. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). See supra notes 60-68 and
accompanying text.
78. Quinn, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 797-802, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 902-05 (Crosby, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 802-05, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07 (Trotter, P.J., concurring).
80. See supra notes 15-23, 47-48 and accompanying text.
81. 27 Cal. App. 2d 733, 81 P.2d 625 (1938). In Ratcliff, the plaintiff was hit by a bat as
she was on her way to her seat. The court allowed her to recover, affirming the jury's finding
that the ball club had a duty to protect patrons from flying bats and that the ball club was
negligent. The court held that "[w]hile the appellant was required to exercise only ordinary
care in protecting [Ms. Ratcliff] from such an injury as this ... that duty was not performed if
such an occurrence ... should have been reasonably anticipated by the [ball club]." Id. at 738,
81 P.2d at 627. The court recognized Quinn and evidently interpreted its holding to be limited
to injuries from batted or thrown balls. The court in Ratcliff held that if the injury was caused
in some other way, the extent of the ballpark's duty was a jury question. Id., 81 P.2d at 628.
See also Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 483 Pa. 75, 394 A.2d 546 (1978) (plaintiff hit
during batting practice while standing on interior walkway presented jury question on assump-
tion of risk); Maytnier v. Rush, 80 Ill. App. 2d 336, 225 N.E.2d 83 (1967) (plaintiff does not
assume risk of being hit by ball thrown by pitcher in warm-up area when plaintiff watching
game in play); Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925)
(plaintiff does not assume risk when more than one ball in play).
82. See supra notes 24-30, 49-52 and accompanying text.
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tors assumed the risk of being hit by baseballs in the course of the ball-
game, but after Quinn spectators choosing screened seats did not assume
any risk.83 Judge Crosby construed Quinn as limiting the ballpark's as-
sumption of risk defense by enlarging the ballpark's legal duty. 4 The
duty was increased by requiring ballparks to provide screened seats for a
reasonable number of fans. In Judge Crosby's view, Ratcliff further lim-
ited the assumption of risk defense and enlarged the ballpark's duty by
holding that spectators do not assume the risk of flying bats or other
unusual but foreseeable hazards." Judge Crosby recognized the dual
roles assumption of risk plays in ballpark liability when stating that
Brown was based on an absence of duty, and thus a finding of no negli-
gence, as much as on assumption of risk.8 6
Judge Crosby also emphasized that duty may be defined by judicial
decision; that the ballpark's duty was established long ago and is settled;
and that there is no reason to question the Quinn analysis.87 He argued
that Rowland v. Christian88 did not apply for three reasons. First, Row-
land did not raise the duty a landowner owes to a business invitee so the
ballpark's duty to a spectator was not increased.89 Second, Rowland ad-
dressed only hidden dangers, while the dangers at the ballpark were obvi-
ous." Third, Rowland did not hold that a summary judgment based on a
lack of duty was improper.9"
Judge Crosby concluded that the ballpark's duty did not need to be
reexamined.92 At the same time, he recognized that Anaheim Stadium
did not, and most likely could not, meet the Quinn rule. In fact, Judge
Crosby made a statement that may apply to every major league stadium:
It is doubtful any seats behind the screen are ever available
from the box office for a single ... game .... Application of
Quinn is thus really a means of imposing a more certain burden
on [the stadium]. It has but two choices: (1) provide adequate
numbers of unreserved, screened seats or (2) secure insurance
coverage for the statistically predictable numbers who will suf-
fer injury by spreading the cost to all patrons. I suspect the
83. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 797-98, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 902 (Crosby, J., concurring).
84. Id. (Crosby, J., concurring).
85. Id. (Crosby, J. concurring).
86. Id. at 798, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (Crosby, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 801-02, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (Crosby, J., concurring).
88. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); see supra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
89. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (Crosby, J., concurring).
90. Id. (Crosby, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 801, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (Crosby, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 802, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (Crosby, J., concurring).
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latter approach is more economical, more practical-and pres-
ently in effect. 93
Judge Crosby also considered assumption of risk as a possible de-
fense. He recognized the overlap between the secondary "reasonable as-
sumption of risk" doctrine and the primary "no duty" analysis, and then
looked at the impact of comparative fault on the spectator injury case.
He concluded that Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 94 only affected unreasonable as-
sumption of risk as it merges with contributory negligence.95 He relied
on various secondary sources, other jurisdictions and the language in Li
that suggested that reasonable implied assumption of risk-as it acts to
reduce the defendant's initial duty of care-has not been affected by the
adoption of comparative fault.96 In Judge Crosby's view, Li excepted
this area from comparative fault in its statement recognizing that reason-
able implied assumption of risk, as it reduces duty, is not contributory
negligence, and then expressly including only contributory negligence in
its comparative fault scheme. 97
Judge Crosby essentially argued that Li did not change the assump-
tion of risk analysis when the plaintiff's conduct is defined as reasonable.
If the plaintiff acted reasonably in selecting a screened or unscreened seat
at the baseball game, he has relieved the ballpark of its duty toward him.
Any duty other than that required by Quinn is negated by the spectator's
seat selection.
B. Judge Trotter's Opinion
Judge Trotter maintained that summary judgment was never proper
in a spectator injury case. He first criticized his colleagues' reliance on
Quinn v. Recreation Park Association arguing that their adherence to the
"old rule" ignored California's common law tradition.9" Judge Trotter
also argued that Rowland v. Christian has changed a ballpark's duty to-
ward its patrons and that, under Li v. Yellow Cab Co., assumption of risk
does not apply.99
Judge Trotter argued that Rowland marked "a significant departure
from prior adherence to rigid common law classifications which blindly
93. Id. at 804 n.5, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06 n.5 (Crosby, J., concurring).
94. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); see supra text accompanying
notes 60-69.
95. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 798, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (Crosby, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 799-800, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04 (Crosby, J., concurring).
97. See supra text accompanying note 63 for language Judge Crosby relies upon.
98. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 802-05, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07 (Trotter, P.J.,
concurring).
99. Id. (Trotter, P.J., concurring).
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conditioned a given plaintiff's right to recovery" on "the status of the
plaintiff as a trespasser, licensee or invitee.' ' "°° He submitted that the
more recent cases of Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course1 and Slater v.
Alpha Beta Acme Markets'02 have interpreted Rowland as having "trans-
muted" the issue of a landowner's liability from one of law to one of
fact.103 Judge Trotter argued that the reasonableness of a landowner's
conduct in the management of.his property should be determined by the
trier of fact, based on the factors set forth in Rowland.1"4 Judge Trotter
held that this triable issue of fact always exists in the ballpark liability
cases; thus, summary judgment is never appropriate.1
5
Judge Trotter also stated that under the Li scheme of comparative
fault, neither contributory negligence nor assumption of risk is an abso-
lute bar to recovery.1 6 This implies that the reasonableness or unreason-
ableness of a spectator's actions in selecting a seat at the ballpark should
be an issue of fact. The court would then weigh the spectator's actions
against those of the ballpark. If a spectator acted reasonably, the trier of
fact could find his behavior more reasonable than that of the ballpark. In
that case, the spectator would be allowed some recovery. Judge Trotter
concluded by emphasizing that since Quinn was decided in 1935, changes
in tort law and in the "grand old game" itself compel a reexamination of
100. Id. at 804, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (citation omitted) (Trotter, P.J., concurring).
101. 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969). In Beauchamp, a woman was injured
when she slipped on a cement golf course ramp while wearing golf shoes. The court held as
follows:
Under Rowland v. Christian ... we are impelled to conclude that the obvious
nature of the risk, danger or defect ... can no longer be said per se to. . . derogate
[the landowner's] duty of care, so as to make his liability solely a matter of law to be
determined on a nonsuit. By that decision, this matter of law for the court is trans-
muted to a question of fact for the jury; namely, whether a possessor of land even in
respect to the obvious risk has acted reasonably in respect to the probability of injury
to an invitee ....
Id. at 33, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
102. 44 Cal. App. 3d 274, 118 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1975). In Slater, a supermarket customer
was pushed to the floor by another customer during an armed robbery. The supermarket had
been robbed before and, at the time of Ms. Slater's injury, plainclothes police officers were
present at the supermarket's request. Ms. Slater argued that the supermarket had a duty to
warn her that a robbery might occur and that its failure to warn was negligent. The appellate
court held that it was for the trial judge, as the trier of fact, to determine any unformulated
standard of reasonable conduct the supermarket would be held to in light of California Civil
Code § 1714 and Rowland v. Christian. Id. at 278, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 562-63. The trial court
had held that by notifying the police of the robberies and arranging for plainclothesmen, the
supermarket had acted reasonably toward its customers. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's judgment for the supermarket. Id. at 279, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64.
103. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (Trotter, P.J., concurring).
104. See supra note 58.
105. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (Trotter, P.J., concurring).
106. Id. (Trotter, P.J., concurring).
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ballpark liability.10 7
V. ANALYSIS
Quinn v. Recreation Park Association was decided in 1935. Since
that time, major changes have occurred in California tort law, particu-
larly when the issue before the court involves a landowner's duty or lim-
its to his liability. The decision in Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters
presents two views (reflected in Judge Trotter's and Judge Crosby's con-
tradictory concurrences) on the effect these changes have had on two
basic questions. First, do Rowland v. Christian and its progeny compel a
reevaluation of a ballpark's duty or of the standard of care that must be
exercised toward baseball spectators? Second, should the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk apply in the baseball spectator injury cases, either in the
duty analysis or under comparative fault?
A. Duty of the Ballpark After Rowland
Courts in most jurisdictions with some form of comparative fault
have backed away from applying an assumption of risk rationale to the
baseball spectator injury cases.108 Instead, their analysis for denying the
spectator any compensation for his injury has been that the ballpark has
a limited duty of care toward the plaintift and, if the ballpark satisfies
this limited duty, it cannot be held negligent. Without a finding of negli-
gence, it cannot be liable. 109
Of course, it has never been argued that the ballpark owes no duty
to the spectator." 0 The principle of Quinn v. Recreation Park Associa-
tion is that such a duty exists but, as advocated by Judge Crosby in Rud-
107. Id. at 804-05, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (Trotter, P.J., concurring).
108. But see Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977)
(spectator at hockey game hit by puck; assumption of risk terminates duty owed to spectator
and remains complete defense despite adoption of comparative fault statute).
109. See Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 424 N.E.2d 531, 441
N.Y.S.2d 644 (1981); see supra note 68.
110. An early ease settling the ballpark's duty was Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibi-
tion Co., 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S.W. 1076 (1913) (defendant's duty of reasonable care met
when screened seats were provided and plaintiff had opportunity to occupy screened seat).
Crane cited two cases in support of its holding: King v. Ringling, 145 Mo. App. 285, 130 S.W.
482 (1910) and Murrell v. Smith, 152 Mo. App. 95, 133 S.W. 76 (1910). Although neither
involved baseball, they were cited as authority in early baseball cases and are interesting exam-
ples of early duty analyses.
In King, defendant Ringling had erected a tent for its circus. A violent wind came up and
the tent began to sway. The ringmaster asked that the spectators crawl under the seats so that
they would be protected if one of the large tent poles were to fall. In the ensuing commotion, a
board fell on the plaintiff, breaking her leg. She sued, claiming the tent was negligently er-
ected. The court held for the circus.
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nick v. Golden West Broadcasters, judicial decision has established that
duty."'1 While such a rule provides certainty, it should not be immune
from periodic scrutiny. Judge Crosby took the position that the
ballpark's duty did not need to be reexamined. 1 2 However, he also rec-
ognized that Anaheim Stadium in Rudnick and probably other major
league baseball stadiums had not met this historical standard of duty." 3
He pointed out that the seats behind the screening-those behind home
plate and along part of the first and third base lines-are generally not
available for the general public. This is because they are considered
among the "best" seats available and are either reserved by longtime sea-
son ticket holders or are the first seats to sell out."
4
Judge Trotter's position, that Rowland v. Christian requires reexam-
ination of the formalistic limited duty of the stadium, is supported not
only by California's strong common law tradition,"' but also by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court's recent decision in Peterson v. San Francisco
Community College District."6 Although Peterson was decided four
months after Rudnick, it supports Judge Trotter's position that Rowland
and its progeny compel a new analysis of the ballpark's liability for spec-
tator injuries.
In Peterson, a female community college student was assaulted while
Unquestionably, the collapse [of the tent] was due to the breaking of the poles,
and this was caused by the violent whipping of the canvas under successive inflations
and deflations. In the grip of this mighty power the heavy poles were but as reeds.
We say that the plain and undisputed physical facts of the situation fail to show any
relation between the injury of plaintiff and the negligence asserted. If these facts left
any room for a reasonable difference of opinion, we would say that an issue of fact
was in the case for the triers of fact to solve, but there is no room for a reasonable
difference of opinion, and it is our duty to hold as a matter of law that plaintiff has
failed completely to sustain her burden of proof.
145 Mo. App. at 294-95, 130 S.W. at 485.
In Murrell, a child playing under a bandstand at a street fair was crushed when the band-
stand collapsed. The court held that the organizer of the fair was negligent, emphasizing that
the duty of the promoter was a jury question.
[T]he issue was presented to the jury whether a reasonably prudent man, under all
the circumstances, would have had reasonable grounds to anticipate the platform
was likely to collapse and injure those around it, and whether the defendants used
reasonable care to prevent the catastrophe.
152 Mo. App. at 118, 133 S.W. at 83.
111. "'[T]he proper conduct of a reasonable person under particular situations may become
settled by judicial decision.'" Rudnick v. Golden W. Broadcasters, 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 801,
202 Cal. Rptr. 900, 905 (1984) (Crosby, J., concurring) (quoting Satterlee v. Orange Glenn
School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 587, 177 P.2d 279 (1947)).
112. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
114. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 801, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (Crosby, J., concurring).
115. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 802-03, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 906 (Trotter, P.J., concurring).
116. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984).
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in the stairway of the school's parking lot. 17 She sued the community
college district for damages from the assault, alleging that the district
had a duty to warn her of the danger and/or to protect her from assaults
by third persons."' The lower court had sustained defendant's demurrer
to plaintiff's complaint. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the community college had both a duty of care to protect the plain-
tiff from reasonably foreseeable assaults and a duty to warn her of the
known dangers.1 9
In its analysis, the court emphasized that "[t]he question of a duty
'... is ... only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection.' "120 The policy considerations are those set out in Row-
land.121 The court recognized additional guidelines for determining duty
of care.'22 In particular, the court emphasized the high duty a land-
owner has to protect members of the public from foreseeable injury while
they are on his premises.123 The duty of care the ballpark owes to specta-
117. Id. at 805, 685 P.2d at 1195, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
118. Id., 685 P.2d at 1195-96, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45.
119. Id. at 815, 685 P.2d at 1202-03, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52. However, the court held
that the college, as a public entity, was not liable for failing to provide police protection. Id. at
844, 685 P.2d at 1202, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
120. Id. at 805-06, 685 P.2d at 1196, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1968)).
121. Id. at 806, 685 P.2d at 1196, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 845. See supra text accompanying note
58.
122. The court's statement on a landowner's duty follows:
As a general rule one has no duty to control the conduct of another, and no duty
to warn those who may be endangered by such conduct. A duty may arise, however,
where "(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other the right to
protection." Among the commonly recognized special relationships are that between
a common carrier and its passengers, that between an innkeeper and his or her
guests, and that between a possessor of land and members of the public who enter in
response to the landowner's invitation.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 203, 649
P.2d 894, 897, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1982)).
123. The court discussed the duty a landowner owes to a business invitee as follows:
It has long been recognized that "a possessor of land who holds it open to the public
for entry for business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while
they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the acciden-
tal, negligent or intentionally harmful acts of third persons.., and by the failure of
the possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done
or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid
the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it."
Id. at 807, 685 P.2d at 1197, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Slater v. Alpha Beta Acme Mkts., Inc., 44 Cal. App. 3d 274, 279 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. 561,
563 n.3 (1975); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text).
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tors paying to come see the ball game should be considered in light of
Peterson and its interpretation of the policy factors of Rowland.
Under the reasoning in Peterson, it appears that the ballpark may be
liable for physical injuries to plaintiffs even when the injury is caused by
the acts of third persons (i.e., the man at bat or some other player). The
ballpark should also be liable for failing to warn that the ballpark does
not otherwise protect the spectator from the risk.124 The ballpark could
still avoid liability on that basis by giving actual notice to spectators that
(1) they may be injured by baseballs if they are sitting in the unscreened
area and (2) that they have a legal right to request a screened seat in
order to avoid the injury.
Applying the Rowland factors, the duty of the ballpark toward spec-
tators should be increased to provide them greater protection. The first
factor in Rowland is the "foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff."
125
Clearly, it is foreseeable that a baseball may enter the stands and injure a
spectator. The assumption of risk analysis discussed in the baseball cases
assumes that both the ballpark and the spectator know that injury is fore-
seeable. The second factor in Rowland is the "degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury." 126 Again, common sense and a glance at the
spectator injury cases demonstrate that those specators hit by fast-mov-
ing baseballs suffer serious injuries.
12 7
124. The Los Angeles Times carried a brief article on a Texas trial court decision in which
the Houston Sports Association, owner of the Houston Astros, was found negligent for failing
to warn baseball spectators "of the hazard posed by foul balls hit during baseball games at the
Astrodome." L.A. Times, July 11, 1985, pt. III, at 13, cols. 1-2. According to the Times, an
I 1-year-old girl was hit in the head by a ball estimated to be traveling at 125 miles per hour. A
jury awarded her and her father $55,000 in compensatory damages and $125,000 in punitive
damages. Id. The trial court's decision, Friedman v. Astrodomain Corp., No. 79-27215 (un-
published opinion) has been appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. See Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 19, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
It will be interesting to see whether this decision is overturned on appeal. Texas has a
comparative fault statute (see TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) § 1 (Vernon Supp.
1985)) and its position on primary assumption of risk is not clear. Compare Parker v. High-
land Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978) with Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751
(Tex. 1975). See also infra note 154.
125. See supra text accompanying note 58.
126. Id.
127. Although many of the baseball cases fail to specify the nature of the injury, of those
that do so eye injuries are the most prevalent. In at least three cases, the plaintiff lost the sight
in one eye. See Davidoff v. Metro. Baseball Club, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 996, 463 N.E.2d 1219, 475
N.Y.S.2d 367 (1984); Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 424 N.E.2d 531,
441 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1981); Clapman v. City of New York, 63 N.Y.2d 669, 468 N.E.2d 697, 479
N.Y.S.2d 515 (1984) (extent of injury documented in lower court's unpublished opinion,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 24, 1982, at 13, col. 4).
California fans have also been seriously injured. In Fish v. Los Angeles Dodgers Baseball
Club, 56 Cal. App. 3d 620, 128 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1976), a 14-year-old boy died after being hit by
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The next factor to consider is "the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered."' 28 In Peterson,
this factor was analyzed as follows: "[G]iven that the defendants were in
control of the premises and that they were aware of the prior assaults, it
is clear that failure to apprise students of those incidents, to trim the
foliage, or to take other protective measures closely connects the defend-
ants' conduct with plaintiff's injury."19 Similarly, given the obvious
foreseeability of baseballs entering the stands and injuring spectators,
failure to take protective measures forms the necessary connection. The
fourth factor is the "moral blame attached to the defendant's con-
duct."' 30 Under Peterson, this factor is established once the first three
factors are met.1
3 1
The final three factors are interrelated: "[T]he policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting lia-
bility for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved."' 32 First, of course, there is a general social policy
of preventing harm which should be encouraged whenever economically
feasible. The analysis of these remaining factors may differ, resulting in
different standards of care for the major league commercial baseball sta-
dium or the smaller, municipal diamond used for school and Little
League games.
The reason the analysis may differ is rooted in the economics of each
enterprise. If the duty of the major league commercial stadium is in-
creased (e.g., requiring the stadium to increase the extent of its screening,
warn spectators of the danger, or inform spectators of the availability of
seats in the screened area and hold a reasonable number of seats open for
each game), the costs of compliance could be spread throughout a large
consumer base. Alternatively, the cost of liability insurance could be met
by a small surcharge on tickets. Unlike its major league counterpart, the
a line-drive foul which fractured his skull and caused an intracerebral hemorrhage. Id. at 624-
26, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12. The facts in Fish were particularly ironic. The boy was hit by the
ball, treated at the stadium's emergency first aid station, and released to watch the rest of the
game, during which he chased a foul ball. After the game, his condition worsened, and he died
a few days later. The family's wrongful death action against the stadium was successful; how-
ever, it was based on the emergency physician's negligence in releasing the boy without con-
ducting a proper examination, rather than on the ballpark's failure to protect the fan. Id. at
623, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
128. See supra text accompanying note 58.
129. 36 Cal. 3d at 814, 685 P.2d at 1202, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
130. See supra text accompanying note 58.
131. 36 Cal. 3d at 814, 685 P.2d at 1202, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
132. See supra text accompanying note 58.
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smaller baseball diamond may not have the economic resources or spec-
tator volume to carry liability insurance to compensate those injured by
fast-moving baseballs. This does not mean, however, that the duty of the
smaller ballpark should not be reevaluated.
The smaller ballpark has a number of low-cost options available that
would reduce the risk of injury to the baseball spectator. First, the
ballpark could post prominent signs informing patrons of the risk of in-
jury. These signs could emphasize that the screen was in place for the
patrons' safety. Additionally, these signs could warn the baseball fan
that if he is injured while outside of the screened area, the ballpark is not
liable for his injuries. Alternatively, the ballpark might increase the ex-
tent of its screening to cover the areas of higher risk (generally, the areas
along the first and third base lines). There may be other options avail-
able. These kinds of protective measures might lead the trier of fact to
find that the ballpark had satisfied its duty toward the spectators result-
ing in a finding of no negligence.
Whether the ballpark acted reasonably in protecting spectators from
harm should be a question for the jury. If the ballpark takes actions
making the game safer for the spectator, the jury may find that the
ballpark acted reasonably, under the policies of Rowland and guidelines
in Peterson.133 The jury could appropriately tailor the standard of care to
both the smaller ballpark and the major league stadium by considering
the community expectations involved, the economics of the enterprise,
and the knowledge and actions of the particular plaintiff.
B. Assumption of Risk Revisited
As discussed earlier, the spectator's agreement to assume the risk of
injury inherent in watching a ball game from an unscreened seat is im-
plied by the baseball spectator's reasonable conduct in taking an un-
screened seat. 134 This reasonable implied assumption of risk may be
primary, relieving the ballpark of a duty to protect the spectator from a
baseball coming at high speed off a foul tip or a wild throw. Alterna-
tively, this reasonable implied assumption of risk may be secondary,
where the spectator impliedly covenants not to hold the ballpark liable
for its negligence in failing to protect the spectator from these flying
133. In addition, as in Peterson, there may be an issue of governmental immunity when the
ballpark is owned and operated by a municipality. See generally Peterson v. San Francisco
Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 809-13, 685 P.2d 1193, 1198-202, 205 Cal. Rptr.
842, 847-51 (1984); the California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815-835.4 (West
1980).
134. See generally supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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baseballs. 35
It is probable that secondary assumption of risk has not been used to
relieve the ballpark from liability since the California Supreme Court's
decision in Quinn v. Recreation Park Association. According to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, the essential elements of secondary assump-
tion of risk, as a complete defense, are "(1) full knowledge and
appreciation of the risk; (2) voluntary exposure to the risk; and (3) cir-
cumstances that manifest plaintiff's willingness to accept the risk."'
136
These elements are to be determined by a subjective inquiry into the par-
ticular plaintiff's actual knowledge. 137 The plaintiff in Quinn satisfied
these three elements. She "frankly admitted knowing at the time she
took the unscreened seat she would be in danger of being struck by a
batted ball."' 38  She chose to take this unscreened seat after being told
that screened seats in the area she preferred were not available. 3 9 After
the court of appeal's decision in Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, how-
ever, the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk is imputed and this subjective
inquiry required by secondary assumption of risk is no longer
followed.'"
If secondary assumption of risk remains available as a defense to
negligence in the spectator injury actions, it may be included in the com-
parative fault scheme established by Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 4 Judge
Crosby, in Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters, argued that this form of
assumption of risk does not affect the spectator injury case because the
ballpark is not negligent as a matter of law. Without negligence, assump-
tion of risk and comparative fault are meaningless.'42 On the other hand,
Judge Trotter may have been arguing that even if this form of assump-
tion of risk exists as a defense to negligence-and assuming the ballpark
is found negligent-the injured spectator's recovery will not be reduced
under principles of comparative fault.'43 Authority for Judge Trotter's
135. See generally supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 (C)(1) (1965).
137. Id.
138. Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n, 3 Cal. 2d 725, 731, 46 P.2d 144, 146-47 (1935).
139. Id. at 730, 46 P.2d at 146.
140. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
143. It is not entirely clear from Judge Trotter's opinion whether the baseball spectator's
reasonable assumption of risk is to be considered in comparing the fault of the parties or
whether a "reasonable" plaintiff recovers in full.
Li... held the doctrine of contributory negligence is superseded by a system of
comparative negligence which assesses liability in direct proportion to fault. In so
holding, the defense of assumption of the risk was abolished to the extent it is merely
a variant of the contributory negligence doctrine. Thus, under Li, unlike Quinn,
STRIKE ONE, AND YOU'RE OUT
position is found in the California Court of Appeal's decision in Segovi-
ano v. Housing Authority.1"
In Segoviano, a young man separated his left shoulder while playing
in a flag football game organized by the Stanislaus County Housing Au-
thority. At trial, the jury was instructed on contributory negligence and
comparative fault, but not on assumption of risk. The jury returned a
verdict for the young man, reducing his recovery by thirty percent, after
finding him contributorily negligent. The court of appeal reversed and
awarded the plaintiff full recovery, holding that contributory negligence
and any reduction it would have on plaintiff's recovery does not apply
when the plaintiff acted reasonably. 45
The court of appeal held that comparative negligence is only to be
considered when the plaintiff acts unreasonably. Here, the plaintiff acted
reasonably and the court decided that California's comparative fault law
does not apply to cases in which the plaintiff's actions are termed reason-
able implied assumption of risk. Specifically, Segoviano held that Li v.
Yellow Cab Co. completely abolished secondary reasonable implied as-
sumption of risk and primary reasonable implied assumption of risk in
most circumstances.
We hold that [reasonable implied assumption of risk] plays no
part in the comparative negligence system of California; it is
neither a bar to plaintiff's recovery on the theory that it fore-
closes the existence of a duty of care by the defendant toward
the plaintiff nor is it a partial defense justifying allocation of a
portion of the fault for the accident to the plaintiff on the the-
ory that he or she was contributorily negligent in confronting
the risk. It is only when the defendant proves that the plain-
tiff's decision to participate in the activity was unreasonable
that a jury may allocate damages between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Such an allocation is permissible because the de-
fendant has proved that the plaintiff was negligent. Whether
the plaintiff's decision to expose himself... to the risk of injury
was unreasonable under all of the circumstances will be a ques-
tion for the jury unless it can be held as a matter of law that the
decision was reasonable.
1 46
neither contributory negligence nor assumption of the risk will absolutely bar Rud-
nick from recovery.
Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (Trotter, P.J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
144. 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983).
145. Id. at 176, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
146. Id. at 164, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80 (emphasis in original).
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Under Segoviano, the plaintiff who acts reasonably in exposing himself to
some risk may recover in full for any resulting injuries.1 47 The inquiry
focuses on the defendant's actions; if the defendant is negligent, 148 the
plaintiff may recover. 4 9
Applying Segoviano to the baseball spectator injury case, the defend-
ant ballpark must first be found negligent. Once it is found negligent, the
spectator will recover in full, regardless of what he knew about the risk of
injury inherent in sitting in the unscreened area. The only requirement is
that the plaintiff's conduct must be termed reasonable. Under Segoviano,
this requirement is easy to meet and may be determined by law.'50
Even if Segoviano is not followed, it may be unfair to apply any form
of assumption of risk to the ballpark spectator. The regular baseball fan,
attending a baseball game, certainly knows that balls enter the stands.
The occasional spectator, even if the only games that he has watched
were on television, also knows that balls enter the stands and are consid-
ered valuable souvenirs. However, as demonstrated by the facts in Brown
and Rudnick, many spectators do not realize that by simply sitting in an
unscreened seat, they assume the risk of incurring a serious injury.I5 In
addition to assuming the risk of injury, the spectator may unknowingly
assume all responsibility for the costs resulting from the injury.'52
It is unfair for the baseball spectator to be held to assume the risk of
such costs in the absence of reasonable notice and clearer evidence of
actual consent, as required under the traditional affirmative defense of
assumption of risk.153 If the ballpark may continue to shelter under the
147. Id. at 174-75, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
148. Id. at 175, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
149. This result is contrary to the California Supreme Court's intent in adopting compara-
tive fault. The court stated, "[tihe fundamental purpose ... shall be to assign responsibility
and liability for damage in direct proportion to the amount of negligence of each of the par-
ties." Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875
(1975) (emphasis added).
150. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 175-76, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
151. See Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 901; Brown, 99 Cal. App. 2d
at 488-89, 222 P.2d at 21.
152. In fact, most spectators are unfamiliar with baseball tort law and, when surveyed,
responded that they expected compensation for any baseball-caused injury incurred at a major
league game. In 1984, the author conducted a survey of 100 persons between the ages of 18
and 65 who attended baseball games in the Southern California area. None of the people had
any legal training. Only 13 of those surveyed did not expect compensation. Survey taken in
September and October (1984).
153. The issue of notice was addressed by the court in Brown, 99 Cal. App. 2d at 491, 222
P.2d at 23. The court stated, "'[i]t would have been absurd, and no doubt would have been
resented by many patrons, if the ticket seller, or other employees, had warned each person
entering the park that he or she would be imperiled by vagrant baseballs in unscreened ar-
eas.'" Id. (quoting Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. Civ. App.
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defense of assumption of risk as a defense to negligence or as a reason for
limiting the ballpark's duty, the jury should be called upon to verify that
the requisite knowledge and consent were present.154
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR STRICT LIABILITY
An alternative method of analyzing ballpark liability for spectator
injuries may be found by looking to the cases on strict liability for prod-
uct design defects. Under the California Supreme Court's decisions in
Barker v. Lull Engineering,55 Daly v. General Motors Corp.,156 and most
recently Campbell v. General Motors Corp., applying strict liability to a
major league baseball stadium may now be appropriate to fulfill consider-
ations of public policy and economic efficiency.
Strict liability could be imposed on a major league baseball stadium
under the guidelines of Barker.158 While it may at first appear that prod-
ucts liability cases have no bearing on a ballpark liability analysis, there
are some compelling similarities. First, the court in Barker emphasized
that the focus of the inquiry is on the product, not the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct. 159 The product in a specta-
tor injury suit could be a major league baseball game held in a modem
baseball stadium. As a product, it may be held defective. Barker sets
out a two-part inquiry; fulfilling either part establishes a prima facie case
1941)). While this may have been the case in 1940, it appears less absurd now when everything
from children's toys to toasters carry extensive warnings. Again, the expectations of the public
have changed.
154. The court of appeals in Michigan recently addressed the duty to warn in Falkner v.
John E. Fetzer, Inc., 113 Mich. App. 500, 317 N.W.2d 337 (1982). In Falkner, the plaintiff
was hit by a ball at Tiger Stadium. Her case was presented to the jury on the theory that the
ballpark breached its duty to warn. The appellate court stated that "generally... there is no
duty to warn of the risk of being hit by batted balls when attending a baseball game because the
risk is obvious." Id. at 502, 317 N.W.2d at 339 (citation omitted). However, the court recog-
nized that the plaintiff had "presented an apparently unique record in an attempt to demon-
strate that the magnitude of the risk involved is much greater than commonly believed." Id. at
502-03, 317 N.W.2d at 339. The court held that "it was proper to submit to the jury the
question of whether it would be reasonable to require defendant to warn spectators of the
unexpectedly high degree of risk." Id. at 503, 317 N.W.2d at 339. The jury had returned a
verdict for the plaintiff, reducing her recovery by five percent under Michigan's comparative
fault law.
The court of appeals reversed the jury verdict holding that although the plaintiff had
successfully proved negligence, she failed to prove proximate cause. "[P]laintiffs failed to pres-
ent any evidence to show that if a proper warning had been given, plaintiff ... would have
taken precautions to prevent the injury." Id. at 503, 317 N.W.2d at 339.
155. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
156. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
157. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
158. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
159. Id. at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
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of defective design. First, a product's design may be defective if it fails to
meet ordinary consumer expectations when used as intended or in a rea-
sonably foreseeable manner. Second, the design may be found defective
if the plaintiff demonstrates that the design proximately caused his in-
jury. If the plaintiff proves proximate cause, the burden of proof shifts to
the defendant, requiring the defendant to justify that the design's benefits
outweigh its risks." °
Under the Barker test, one confronts an immediate problem: What
degree of safety does the ordinary baseball spectator expect when watch-
ing the game? Current case law assumes that the spectator accepts the
possibility of injury if he is sitting an an unscreened seat. Even if the
spectator does expect or know he may be injured, he may not expect that,
if injured, he will not be compensated. 161
In Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters, Ms. Rudnick expected that
she would be protected from baseballs, despite the absence of a screen.1
62
This may have been a reasonable assumption because the partial screen-
ing may give the spectator the impression that foul balls only enter the
screened area and that the areas outside the screen are safe. In addition,
in the ordinary major league baseball game, the spectator is barraged
with distractions: fellow spectators, vendors, light posts for night games,
electronic scoreboards and now, large television screens allowing the
spectator to watch the game without ever seeing the actual ball in play.
The modem spectator, having paid for his seat and occupying it in the
proper manner, most likely expects safety from the all-American pas-
time, just as he does from his automobile when out on a Sunday drive.
The second test in Barker requires only that the plaintiff show that a
defective design proximately caused his injury.163 Under the California
Supreme Court's recent decision in Campbell v. General Motors Corp.,Z64
if the plaintiff alleges that the lack of a safety device proximately caused
the injury, the case should be submitted to the jury to determine whether
this second prong of Barker is met.' 61 In Rudnick, had Ms. Rudnick
alleged that the lack of a screen caused her injury under Campbell, she
might have had her case submitted to the jury.
In Campbell, the plaintiff claimed that her injury was caused by the
absence of a safety bar in front of her seat on a city bus. 166 The bus
160. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
161. See supra note 152.
162. 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 796, 202 Cal. Rptr. 900, 901 (1984).
163. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
164. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
165. Id. at 120-21, 649 P.2d at 228-29, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96.
166. Id. at 116, 649 P.2d at 226, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
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rounded a sharp corner and she was injured when she fell out of her
seat. 16 7 A modern baseball spectator might claim he was injured because
the stadium lacked a screen in front of his seat. In Campbell, the facts
made it clear that the woman was a frequent bus rider who was familiar
with the route and who actually knew the bus was about to make the
sharp turn that led to her fall onto the floor. However, because she was
injured the court held that she stated a cause of action under Barker.168
A modern baseball fan may see the ball coming and be unable to
protect himself 169 despite his familiarity with the game, the stadium and
the risks involved. Nonetheless, the baseball fan hit by a foul ball is sum-
marily dismissed from court even though the injured baseball fan and the
injured bus passenger are similarly situated and should both be entitled
to a hearing on the merits. Both the bus and the stadium are designed to
meet certain safety requirements, certain consumer expectations and re-
quirements of functionality.17 Both plaintiffs pay for a service. In addi-
tion, both the bus rider and baseball spectator are exposed to constant
distractions, preventing either from exercising the vigilence needed to
protect himself from an unlikely, but foreseeable accident.
17
The basic policy reasons behind strict liability support applying the
doctrine to the major league baseball stadium. The primary policy un-
167. Id. at 116-17, 649 P.2d at 226, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
168. Id. at 119-20, 649 P.2d at 228, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
169. A ball coming off the bat and going into the stands along the first or third base line
may be traveling at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour. See infra note 124. One of the earliest
baseball cases recognized this:
[The plaintiff's] explanation that he was watching the game but failed to see the
course the ball had taken from bat is reasonable and natural. The uncertainty in the
direction, speed and force of a batted ball is one of the interesting and often exciting
features of the game and frequently it is difficult for even the trained eye to follow the
course of the ball.
Edling v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 181 Mo. App. 327, 168 S.W. 908 (1914).
According to the report of the case printed in the Southwestern Reporter, plaintiff's counsel
pointed out that "[i]f the Kansas City Blues had kept their eyes on the ball with the accuracy
defendant says plaintiff should have displayed, they would have attained a higher place in the
race for the pennant." 168 S.W. at 910. In Edling, the plaintiff ultimately recovered because
he was seated in the screened area and the ball went through a hole in the screen. 181 Mo.
App. at 330, 168 S.W. at 910.
170. Both the bus rider and the baseball spectator expect to be safe while in the "custody"
of the bus or the ballpark. Both expect that the seats they occupy are designed for their
intended purpose-whether it be to travel over roads or to watch a major league baseball game
at a large stadium.
171. The baseball spectator is in a worse position than the bus passenger because of the
increased number of distractions present at the major league game. Electronic scoreboards
and large television screens are particularly hazardous because they enable the fan to follow
the game without ever watching the actual ball in play. In addition, many fans bring a radio or
a small screen television to the game to take advantage of the instant replays, the provision of
statistics on each player and the ability to follow other games taking place at the same time.
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derlying this doctrine, is "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are pow-
erless to protect themselves." '72 This doctrine is based on the theory of
allocation of resources. 73 Under this theory, the price a consumer pays
for a product should reflect the societal costs of the product as well as its
production costs. For example, the price one pays for traveling by air-
plane should include not only the costs of fuel, maintenance and person-
nel, but also the costs of the insurance the airline must carry to cover
large air disasters.174 When a product's price reflects all of its costs, the
purchaser's decision to pay that price and keep the product on the mar-
ket is an informed decision.1 75 Thus, resource-allocation theory results
in an enterprise bearing the true costs of doing business, including the
costs incurred by the purchaser who is accidently injured by the
product. 176
Resource-allocation theory also requires that the party in the better
position to allocate the costs of loss bear the burden of the loss.177 This
requirement theoretically results in achieving two related societal goals:
accident reduction and risk distribution.178 Imposing the costs of acci-
dents on the enterprise reduces accidents by providing incentives for
172. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 3d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
173. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499, 500 (1961).
174. Id. at 502-03.
175. Id. at 502.
176. Id. at 505.
177. Id. at 517.
178. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). Justice
Traynor, in his famous concurrence addressing the rationale behind strict liability stated:
Even if there is no negligence ... public policy demands that responsibility be
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent
in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can
anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot. Those who suffer from injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost
of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find
their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negli-
gent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.
However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may
strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such
a risk there should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best
situated to afford such protection.
Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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making products as safe as economically practicable. The risk of high
medical expenses resulting from a defective product does not fall solely
on the plaintiff but is assumed by the manufacturer-the party most able
to spread the costs incrementally among the consumers benefiting from
and choosing to purchase his product.
These economic principles apply as surely to a major league baseball
stadium owner as to a manufacturer. First, the goal of reducing acci-
dents is more easily achieved by the stadium than by the fan. The
ballpark possesses (or can easily compile) statistics on the safety of the
stadium. It can correlate the number of injuries to the area of the sta-
dium. It can then extend the screening to cover areas with a high risk of
injury. 1 79 The costs of such improvements could easily be recovered
through the addition of a small ticket surcharge.
The costs of spectator injuries could also be easily assumed by the
ballpark. Major league baseball as an enterprise could insure against the
costs of these injuries. Although many individuals have some medical
insurance, many do not and the costs of their injuries are passed directly
on to society in general in the form of higher taxes when society is forced
to pay for their medical expenses through government-subsidized health
care programs and through higher private insurance rates for those with
private insurance. The injuries suffered by baseball spectators hit by fast-
moving baseballs can be severe and permanent. 8" If the costs of injuries
are imposed and spread throughout the major league system, the costs
imposed on each spectator would also be very small. Moreover, impos-
ing the costs of spectator injuries upon the enterprise itself would provide
an incentive for improving the design of the stadium so that the game is
safer for all spectators. Once the costs of updating the ballpark's safety
features and the costs of insuring against the statistically inevitable acci-
dents are imposed on the stadium, the ticket prices will accurately reflect
the cost of baseball to society, resulting in a better allocation of resources.
Imposing strict liability on the ballpark would not be the same as
absolute liability. First, the ballpark would have to be found "defective."
Second, if Ms. Rudnick or some other spectator were able to prove a
defect and have a strict liability cause of action recognized, his or her
179. Prof. Dan Schechter queries: "Given the L.A. Dodgers infield, are fans seated along
the first base line subjected to a higher risk of injury?"
The Dodgers committed 166 errors during the 1985 season, more errors than any other
team in the National League. Player Steve Sax was responsible for 22 of them. Prof.
Schechter adds: "To err is human, three err is Steve Sax." Interview with Dan Schechter,
Assoc. Prof. of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California (October 28, 1985).
180. See supra note 127.
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own actions would still be examined. In Daly v. General Motors Corp.,'
the California Supreme Court held that actions in strict liability are still
subject to principles of comparative fault.'82
After Daly, strict liability is effectively limited by comparative fault.
This interaction, along with the requirement of a "defect," guards
against absolute liability being imposed on baseball stadiums, and may
protect the stadium from becoming an insurer for all spectator inju-
ries.183 Imposing strict liability on major league ballparks for spectator
injuries may be the most equitable means of balancing the demands of
fans for safe entertainment with the economic well-being of major league
stadiums.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Note proposed an updated approach to the liability of baseball
stadiums for spectator injuries. Generally, the duty of the ballpark
should be submitted to a jury and liability imposed under the analysis of
Rowland v. Christian and principles of comparative fault. In the case of
major league commercial baseball stadiums, strict liability should be the
rule in order to protect spectators from the costs of severe injuries caused
by high-speed baseballs and to provide the stadium with an incentive to
181. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
In Daly, the family of the decedent sued an automobile manufacturer on a theory of strict
liability for a defectively designed automobile. Daly was killed when he was thrown from his
car after hitting a metal freeway divider at over 50 miles per hour. There was evidence that
Daly had been intoxicated at the time of his death. There was also evidence that Daly's death
could have been avoided if the car door had remained shut and Daly had not been thrown out
of the car. The plaintiffs presented evidence on the defective design of the door latch. The
defendants countered with evidence that Daly's death could have been avoided if he had
locked the car door or had been wearing the shoulder harness and seatbelt. 20 Cal. 3d at 731,
575 P.2d at 1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
The court held that Daly's nonuse of the available door lock and seatbelt could constitute
contributory negligence. Since contributory negligence was merged into a scheme of compara-
tive fault in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text, the court
reasoned that it should apply in situations such as that in Daly. The fact that a strict liability
action was involved was not dispositive, as the economic and proof considerations addressed
by strict liability would not be harmed by applying principles of comparative fault.
182. The court in Daly considered the issue and held:
Having examined the principal objections and finding them not insurmountable,
and persuaded by logic, justice, and fundamental fairness, we conclude that a system
of comparative fault should be and it is hereby extended to actions founded on strict
products liability .... [T]he term "equitable apportionment of loss" is more accu-
rately descriptive of the process, nonetheless, the term "comparative fault" has
gained such wide acceptance by courts and in the literature that we adopt its use
herein.
Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
183. Thus, this result may be more preferable to the stadiums than the result suggested by
Judge Crosby in Rudnick. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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update the safety of the stadiums. This solution would reconcile the con-
flicts evident in the California Court of Appeal's opinion in Rudnick v.
Golden West Broadcasters.
Mary C. St. John

